T h his article explores how results from Iowa may affect outcomes in subsequent nomination con tests. We suggest that how Iowa matters may be determined, at least in part, by how voters and the news media assess whether or not candidates meet or exceed expectations there. American presidential nomination contests are rather unique in that they make use of a sequential election process where voters participating in later contests have information about the results of earlier contests. Scholars recognize the potential effects that this sequential voting has on infor mation used by voters (Morton and Williams 2001) . These elections are also characterized by the fact that they are intra partisan, or de facto non-partisan contests. Thus, voters select from a number of candidates within a party. This lowers the range of policy differentiation across candidates for voters to assess and removes major decision cues. Nomination contests with no incumbent remove the two dominant vote cues (party and incumbency) that voters regularly rely upon in candidate contests. In this regard, presidential nomination elections may be seen as a relatively low-information multi-candidate choice setting where voters must rely upon readily available cues' when making decisions (e.g., Lupia 1994; McDermott 1997; 1998) .
Furthermore, scholars have recognized that choices in presidential-nomination contests and other electoral settings may be affected by preferences for candidates (based either on policies or general likeability), but also by expectations about a candidate's chances of success. Voters and donors may assess candidates in terms of expectations about their prospects for winning the nomination, their prospects for being elected in November, or both (e.g., Abramowitz 1989; Abramson et al. 1992; Mutz 1995) . There is also a rich, cross-national literature that provides systematic evidence of strategic or sophisti cated voting in many multi-party (multi-candidate) choice set tings (for a review see Cox 1997) . For example, we have evidence from elections in Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, Japan, and elsewhere that some voters may defect from their most preferred choice and vote for a lower-ranked option if they perceive their first option has little chance of winning (Cain 1978; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Karp et al. 2002) .
One causal mechanism driving this is voter response to information about a candidate's electoral prospects. This can come in the form of information about a party's historic strength in an electoral district, information about candidate's standing in recent opinion polls, or other sources. Some vot ers are known to adjust vote intentions strategically in response to information from opinion polls (Johnston et al. 1992) . Sup porters of candidates or parties at the margins of viability may be particularly attentive to, and responsive to, information from opinion polls. In nomination elections voters also utilize information from early electoral events to adjust their voting intentions in response to changes in perceptions of viability (Abramson et al. 1992; Bartels 1985) .2 Use of such information may be one process that generates momentum. Scholars are divided as to what momentum really is-whether it reflects learning or rational or irrational behavior (Mutz 1997; Bartels 1988; Brady and Johnston 1987) . That said, the primary way of learning about candidate viability is likely to be the mass media.
EARLY VOTING AND EXPECTATIONS
These strands of literature allow us to understand how, and why, early election events have critical effects on the final out comes in presidential nomination contests. Specifically, how (and why) do the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary affect subsequent results in the nomination process, even when these two states play a trivial direct role in allocating conven tion delegates? Put differently, how do early events in small states contribute to candidate momentum in sequential nom ination contests?
We propose a model of outcomes where early events mat ter, in part, because news about outcomes in these states serve as a major source of information about candidate viability in a relatively low-information choice setting. Early nomination events receive disproportionate media attention (relative to their share of delegates), and much of that media attention relates to expectations about a candidate's performance in early contests. The former claim here is uncontroversial, and the latter has been noted elsewhere (Brady and Johnston 1987) . In this model, the role of the media can be seen as somewhat analogous to the process where share-market analysts set cor porate earnings expectations. In share markets, when a firm exceeds its earnings expectations, its share price may rise. If it fails to meet expectations, its share price may fall. Likewise, more media attention may be earned by candidates who exceed expectations. Those who fall short of expectations may see their share of news coverage shrink. This model also grants the media substantial discretion in setting and adjusting expectations. Reporters, editors, and pun dits define the criteria for determining whether a candidate scored an "easy win," managed an "upset," was "far behind," or suffered "defeat." There is substantial discretion in framing whether 25% is a "Comfortable Second" (Bill Clinton in New Hampshire in 1992), or 23% is a "Strong Second" (Pat Bucha nan in Iowa in 1992); or if 26% is a "Flat Tire" (Bob Dole in New Hampshire in 1996) or 26% is an "Overwhelming Defeat" (Howard Dean in New Hampshire in 2004) .3
Horserace coverage of campaigns involves handicapping the candidate pool-with a substantial proportion of coverage focusing on who the frontrunners are expected to be, who the underdogs are, and who beats or fails to meet expectations. Initially, the decision to even report on one particular candi date rather than another, and the amount of attention granted, can be seen as the expression of media expectations. We can assume that candidates who are not expected to be players in a contest will receive less media attention-if for no other rea Table 1 illustrates who received the most press attention prior to the Iowa caucuses, which we assume to reflect initial (pre Iowa) media expectations of candidate viability.
We also calculate how media attention to these candidates shifted in the days immediately after Iowa and New Hamp shire, respectively, by comparing initial press attention prior to voting to attention in articles after results were known. Table 2 lists the candidates with the largest net changes by how often they were mentioned in stories about Iowa before the vote, and then after. This measure of change in media attention serves as a surrogate measure of how media expectations of candidate viability adjust after Iowa votes. Prior to the result of the 1988 Iowa caucus, expectations (and attention) for Dole, Bush, and Kemp were higher; after Iowa caucused, expectations about Robertson shifted, and he enjoyed greater media atten tion prior to New Hampshire. As another example, Gary Hart received relatively little notice prior to Iowa (10% of Demo cratic candidate mentions in 1984). However, after posting a surprising second-place finish in Iowa (with just 16%, 32 points behind Walter Mondale), his share of media attention in post result coverage of Iowa more than doubled (increasing from 9% to 19% overall), while Mondale's share of press attention declined relative to that given his rivals. Hart's 1984 victory in New Hampshire corresponded with another 27% bounce in attention; Buchanan enjoyed a similar phenomenon after collecting a mere 22,000 Iowa caucus votes in a surprise All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hampshire.7 How then, are initial media expectations set, and how might they predict voting in early events? More important, how do changes in expectations produced by the Iowa results affect voting in a subsequent nominating event (New Hampshire)?8 Conventional wisdom and logic suggest several factors that drive the press to give some candidates more early attention: fundraising, poll standing, incumbency,9 and home-state 1976,1980,1984,1988,1992,1996.2000. and 2008 (coefficients not reported).
advantages.1o We expect candidates who raised more money prior to Iowa, those with higher national poll standings, those from Iowa, and incumbents to receive more initial media atten tion. We measured campaign fundraising as total funds raised the year prior to Iowa in terms of inflation-adjusted (to 2000) dollars. These factors are used to estimate a candidate's share (proportionately) of total news mentions of candidate names prior to Iowa. Although some of these items are well correlated, the correlations are by no means perfect.l Table 4 reports results of estimates of candidate share of press attention in the weeks before Iowa. We find that about 70% of variance in candidate share of press attention (our surrogate for expectations) can be explained by fundraising, poll standing, and the two candidate-specific factors. Each additional 10% in opinion standing is associated with 5% greater media attention, and $10 million adds an additional 4.8% share. These results are not sur prising, but they do illustrate that money and poll numbers are not perfect predictors of media attention. Part of press coverage likely involves setting expectations by interpreting if a less-known but well-financed candidate is deserving of as much attention as a well-known officeholder. Indeed, these nomination contests are frequented by well-financed candidates who gain little traction with vot ers (John Connelly, $19 million in 1980; John Glenn, $11 mil lion in 1984; Phil Gramm, $22.3 million in 1996; Rudy Giuliani, $51 million in 2008) and well-financed candidates who were relatively unknown quantities early on (Robertson, $24 mil lion in 1998; Steve Forbes, $20 million in 1996; Mitt Romney, $74 million in 2008).12 What then are the potential effects of media attention/expectations, independent of candidate poll standing and fundraising? Or, forgetting pretense to causal arguments, does media attention predict something that fund raising and poll standing might not? Table 5 reports estimates of Iowa caucus results from 1976 2008, using the standard variables included in models estimat ing nomination outcomes (Norrander 1993; Mayer 1996; 2003) . When standard forecasting variables are used (column 1), money and poll standing appear to have substantial power to predict results in Iowa. In contrast, when press attention to candidates is used to estimate results, the effects of money are eliminated, and the effects of poll standing disappeared (when vote percent is modeled-but not when place of candidate fin ish is estimated). The Iowa vote share is also estimated here with an instrumental variable, where press attention pre dicted from the model reported in Table 4 is used to predict the Iowa vote share. Again, we see that press coverage of a 1976,1980,1984 1988 1992 1996. 2000 . and
(coefficients not reported).
+Instrument generated from Table 4 , without dummies for year.
*Same substantive results with ordered probit.
candidate (predicted by the candidates' fundrais ing and polling numbers) outperforms models that use only polling and finance to predict out comes in Iowa. How should these results be inter preted? Why would media attention better predict (or predict as adequately) as the direct measures of money and poll status? Clearly, media attention to candidates covar ies with fundraising, and there is no way to clearly sort out the alternate causal processes that may be at work here. Reporters and editors may be particularly savvy at using information beyond poll numbers to anticipating who will succeed in Iowa, and thus direct more of their attention to those candidates. That said, these results are consistent with a process where can didates who receive more media attention gain an electoral advantage beyond that associated with their fundraising and national standing in opinion polls.
Iowa's potential effects on nomination con tests in subsequent states are a more important matter. As good as reporters, editors, and pun dits may be at anticipating outcomes in Iowa, they often find their initial expectations were off. One of the primary political functions of the news media is interpreting and framing events-that is-defining the meaning of such things as vic tory, second place, or 26%. Expectations are then adjusted, with increased attention directed at candidates who exceeded initial expectations (Hart in 1984; Robertson in 1988; Buchanan in 1996; Kerry in 2004) or were not expected to do well anyway (Bill Clinton and Paul Tsongas in 1992). Table 6 reports estimates of the New Hampshire primary results from 1976 to 2008. Candi date vote shares (and places) are estimated as a function of the standard variables (early poll standing, finances, state of residence), with two independent variables representing the potential effects of Iowa: the candidate's vote share in Iowa and the change in media attention directed at the candidate immediately after Iowa.13 Again, the underlying assumption here is that some voters opt for candidates they expect to be more viable, and that they make use of election results, and the media's interpretation of results, to assess viability.
Results in Table 6 , albeit estimated with aggregate data, are consistent with such a process. We see a robust association between a candidate's performance in Iowa and New Hamp shire. The Iowa vote share, and the Iowa place of finish (not shown), are significant predictors of the New Hampshire vote share, the likelihood of winning in New Hampshire, and the place of finish in New Hampshire. This result holds when we control for the candidate's fundraising and initial standing in national polls. Independent of these effects, we also see that change in media attention toward a candidate post-Iowa also has a significant relationship with support in New Hampshire. Candidates like Hart, Robertson, Buchanan, and Kerrymayhave had an additional edge in New Hampshire because of the shift in media attention they eamed from their surprise finishes in Iowa. Although there is no relationship between the shift in media attention toward a candidate and winning New Hamp shire, the potential importance of the media bounce coming out of Iowa on the overall nomination contest should not be underestimated.
As Table 7 shows, performance in New Hampshire is a strong predictor of the aggregate primary vote (and thus del egate share), with Iowa having a more muted effect (depend ing on specification). But results in Table 7 demonstrate that change in media attention after Iowa, and after New Hamp shire, have important substantive effects on how much sup port a candidate receives throughout the nomination contest. Increased attention to a candidate immediately after Iowa, and immediately after New Hampshire, has a significant rela tionship with increased vote share across the nomination con tests. When Table 5 and Table 6 are considered together, the results suggest that changes in news about candidates due to results in Iowa affect how well a candidate does in New Hamp shire. Candidate performance in New Hampshire then pro duces additional adjustments in media attention to candidates (and expectations about viability), and this is associated with how well a candidate fares overall. One need not win Iowa to win New Hampshire, nor must one win New Hampshire to win a nomination (although it clearly helps). However, addi tive models in Table 7 Note: All models estimated with dummies for 1976,1980,1984 1988 1992 1996.2000. and 2004 (not reported). Note: OLS estimates unless noted otherwise. All models estimated with dummies for 1976,1980. 1984 1988.1992.1996 . and 2000 (not reported).
nomination process is sequential. Success in New Hampshire corresponds with earlier electoral success in Iowa and the media bounce associated with beating expectations in Iowa. Beating early expectations may determine whether a candi dacy ends quickly or whether it lasts longer. We also produced estimates from the first model in Table 7 Table 8 . Table 8 illustrates that the model performs fairly well in predicting the overall vote share for the main candidates, although it under predicts Obama's and McCain's vote share. Of course, vote share is not the same as winning the nomination. Results in Table 7 , and the predictions in Table 8 , suggest that a model based on pre Iowa poll standing, results from the earliest contests, and shift ing media attention do a good job explaining a candidate's vote share (which corresponds highly with how long a candi date remains in the contest). These results also demonstrate that such models have less utility in distinguishing which can didates actually win.
Nomination contests are sequential. This sets the stage for early events to have important effects that cascade over time. Early results can alter media assessments of a candidate's via bility, with the change in news attention breath ing new life into some candidacies while leaving others all but forgotten. From 1976 From -2008 , media expectations about which candidates were via ble were set before Iowa voted. Iowa's results then led to altered media expectations about who the frontrunners were. New Hampshire results fur ther altered media expectations about candidate viability, and these shifts in press attention to candidates then shaped the context voters faced in subsequent states. DISCUSSION 
AND IMPLICATIONS
This presents an important question, then, about the role of the media in setting and shifting expectations about candidate viability. The anal ogy here between share market analysts and the media is obviously imperfect. In the market, the analyst sets expectations, and the market responds. In this election context, we assume the media sets its own expectations and then voters and the media responds to how candidate per formance matches expectations. But where share-market analysts face repercussions if their analyses are flawed (i.e., their clients suffer finan cial loss), there is no such mechanism policing the accuracy of media analysis. News media have substantial discretion in defining who is viable, and there are no strong incentives for the press to set expectations correctly (if that were even possible).
News-media interpretation of whether the same number of votes is a comfortable second place for one candidate or a crushing defeat for another, or whether being a U.S. senator from a nearby state should be used to discount the importance of support for one candidate in New Hampshire (e.g., Paul Tson gas in 1992) but not another (e.g., John Kerry in 2004), may combine with interpretation of random moments in early Table 8 Actual and predicted 2008 Results, From ............................................................................................................. A two-candidate contest between an alleged frontrunner and a surprising opponent is a hard story for reporters, edi tors, and producers to resist because it is an easy story. It is easy, and more exciting, to report that a candidate had a sur prise second place or that someone failed to meet expecta tions than to explain how Iowa actually works. The reality of Iowa-for Democrats at least-is that actual voter support for candidates is not reported and the statewide apportionment of precinct-level delegates has everything to do with general election results from previous years and nothing to do with how many people show up to vote at the precinct nominating caucuses. There is a weak link between the aggregate support a candidate receives across all the precinct caucuses and the delegate totals elected to the county level that media outlets use to report how a candidate placed. In a close contest, it is possible that a candidate who mobilizes new voters and/or has strong support in certain areas will receive the most first preference votes across all precincts but place second or third in the tally of delegates selected for the county conventions.'5 But there must be a story, and in it, someone must win, place, and show; and the story will likely be that someone met, exceeded, or failed to meet media expectations. v NOTES i. In ballot-measure voting, cues may be endorsements and information about proponents and opponents of a measure. Race, gender, and associ ation with salient politician and social groups may also serve as cues in candidate contests.
2. Bartels (1985) demonstrates that candidate preferences are strongly pro jected onto expectations, so the relationship is reciprocal, and that the effects of expectations depend on whether a contest is close or not.
3. These phrases are taken from New York Times headlines. Dean's 26% "Overwhelming Defeat" was a second-place showing in New Hampshire, 12% behind Kerry in 2004. Clinton's 25% "comfortable second" was 8% behind Paul Tsongas in 1992.
4. Morton and Williams (2001) employ laboratory experiments to test their hypotheses about simultaneous vs. sequential elections. Many previous forecasting models estimate aggregate primary vote share or nomination outcome as a simultaneous election either with (Adkins and Dowdle 2001) or without (Mayer 1996; 2003) 8. There is clearly a causal morass in arguing that initial press attention simply reflects expectations that are unique from pure reporting of re sults. The two are highly correlated. However change in media attention from pre-Iowa to post-Iowa coverage is not well correlated with the Iowa vote (r= -0.22), and change in attention is inversely correlated with ini tial Iowa attention (-0.41). 9. Ford in 1976; Carter in 1980. 10. This is limited to Tom Harkin of Iowa, who ran in 1992.
11. The correlation between proportion of mentions and poll strength is 0.68; mentions and money is 0.53; the correlation between money and poll strength is 0.58. where Clinton beat Obama 50% to 45% in a tally of the 10,740 delegates elected by 117,600 voters to 17 county conventions. The geographic distri bution of support across counties led the state party to acknowledge that Obama would receive more national convention delegates than Clinton. As in Iowa, actual preferences of the 117,000 voters were not reported by the party. Most outlets reported the state as a Clinton victory.
